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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we argue for the adoption of a normative defi-
nition of fairness within the machine learning community.
After characterizing this definition, we review the current
literature of Fair ML in light of its implications. We end by
suggesting ways to incorporate a broader community and
generate further debate around how to decide what is fair in
ML.
1 INTRODUCTION
The recent boom of machine learning (ML) applications has
just as quickly given rise to a slew of critics pointing out the
harmful capabilities of these systems. In particular, concerns
of bias and discrimination are being debated as ML systems
for natural language processing [7], judicial sentencing [22],
target advertising [13, 35], image classification [1], and facial
recognition [9, 36] have all proven their ability to inherit bias
and create disparate treatment across groups. Responding
to these findings is a body of work that attempts to import
considerations of "fairness" into our ML approaches [3, 10,
19, 21].
In this paper, we argue for expanding and deepening our
approach to "fairness" in ML practice. Drawing from philos-
ophy and ethics, we offer up a normative account of fairness
where "fair" is a property that is both communally derived
and context dependent. Using this definition, we highlight
three categorical framings through which one may inquire
about the "fairness" of an ML system: fairness of a system,
fairness of an approach, and fairness of a result. We justify
these different framings and then move on to overview con-
temporary approaches to fairness in the ML literature. We
argue the position that the literature has thus far focused on
the problem of disparate treatment without much attention
to other framings. Making this salient allows us to consider
the importance of critically examining "whose version of
fair" we privilege in ML moving forward and argue that tak-
ing a stance on fairness must be understood as invoking an
authority that could be more or less legitimate. We conclude
by offering possible pathways forward for the community
to broaden its approach to fair ML.
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2017.
2 THE CONSTRUCTION OF "FAIRNESS"
There was once a time when fairness or "the good" was be-
lieved to be a static and essential property that could be
derived from divine [28] or rational principle [14]. Determin-
ing what was right or fair was a privilege vested in certain
authorities and the results were absolute, allowing for no
disagreement. This traditional view has changed as modern
philosophy and ethics has revised our typological ways of
thinking into a normative framing where concepts such as
"fair" or "just" are no longer static; rather, they are devel-
oped relative to particular communities (who) and contexts
(when/how). This is why for modern philosophers such as
Richard Rorty [30] or Chantal Mouffe [26], disagreement is
part and parcel of a democratic society where we must navi-
gate these tensions in hopes of finding places of commonality
from which to move forward.
We are now in an age of machine action where algorithms
can benefit some individuals but may do so at the cost of
harming others. Thus, we must not take the responsibility of
implementing fair ML systems lightly. Transitioning fragile
and contentious matters of human judgment to trained mod-
els must be done with care and forethought. As things stand,
any engineer with a data set may codify a notion of fairness
into an ML system without allowing for any disagreement or
community consensus. In order to avoid slipping back into
an essentialist morality where a small elite group decides
what makes a machine action fair with no recourse, it is
critical we expand the available framings and considerations
of "fairness" in ML.
Taking the stance that we should apply our modern ideas
of fairness to ML, we offer the following proposition:
Proposition (P1): A machine learning system can only
be fair with a contextual justification for the choice of a
fairness construct and offering a channel for affected parties
to actively assent or dissent to the fairness of the system.
In P1, a "fairness construct" is a definition for what fair
is taken to mean in the problem space and the approach
used to codify and measure that definition in training and
application. What P1 implies is that a team implementing
an ML system should have a sense of the viewpoints around
fairness in a domain and be prepared to take a stance when
choosing an approach. Further, it dictates some mode of
disagreement be available. For example, either a) creating a
method of algorithmic due process [12] where the fairness
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of a result can be scrutinized or b) working with an active
community to address and resolve disputes over time.
A real-world example where we may require such a defini-
tion of fairness comes around building classifiers for predict-
ing mental health issues using social media data. In research,
there is a tacit acceptance that using social media data to
predict mental health is fair [25, 32]. Models and outputs for
this have been peer-reviewed and the system itself appears
to pass as fair, or at least acceptable. Adopting the norma-
tive standard set by this work, one may believe it is fair for
anyone to build a similar system to predict mental health, no
matter what. And this is exactly what Facebook did–it was
classifying teenagers by their psychological vulnerabilities
such as feeling "insecure," "worthless," or "needing a confi-
dence boost" [33]. However, Facebook’s practice caused a
lot of backlash from its users. The reaction to what such a
system looks like in practice should raise a red flag that our
questions about fairness must go beyond "was the technical
approach fair" or "are the results are fair." It is our belief that
the community of ML researchers and practitioners should
also be asking questions such as "in what context?", "with
what dataset?", and "with what objective?" should a system
be trained to classify mental health. It is here we might con-
sider that the discussion of Fair ML cannot be constrained to
whether the classifier responds equally to similar inputs. It
is our position that ML practitioners must not skirt responsi-
bility in questioning the ethics of what they build so long as
some minimum equality criterion is met.
2.1 Contextualizing Fairness
In order to clarify our position on the role fairness should
play inML, we offer up three categorical questions one might
use to frame an inquiry around the fairness of an arbitrary
ML system: (Q1) "Is it fair to make X ML system?"; (Q2)
"I want to make X ML system, is there a fair technical ap-
proach?"; and (Q3) "I made XML system, are the results fair?".
Each question requires a different set of considerations to
arrive at an answer.
Q1 is asking whether a particular problem, in general, is
fit to be approximated or decided upon by an ML system.
Using P1, this kind of question requires us to consider the
sentiments of the communities it would effect and whether
we have a sense of what a fair automation of the task would
look like. An immediate response may be, "well anything is
worth a try if there’s a reasonable data set and approach,"
but we will come back to why that is a specious assumption.
Q2 relies on a series of methodological questions perhaps
best suited for experts. The fairness of an approach might
rely on knowing what a good sample space might look like
and the potential biases in historical samples. Answering this
question would require an inquiry around whether the set of
available features is a close and fair approximation of what
we want to predict. Finally, we would hope a practitioner
can weigh in on different trade-offs needing consideration
for the choice of a training regime (e.g., [23, 44]).
Q3 gets at the question of treatment. That is, do the outputs
of the algorithm actually correspond to what would consti-
tute a fair response by a human. Answering Q3 requires us
to run tests against the model and unpack the algorithm to
determine qualities such as what input features were consid-
ered important, whether or not different groups have equal
chance for misclassification, and whether any variables were
acting as proxies for protected variables.
In light of these multiple framings, we take the position
that no single framing nor problem space should dominate
the realm of what we may consider fair ML practice. While
we recognize there will always be organizational ethics that
must be further considered beyond what an ML practitioner
can influence, we side with an interpretation of engineering
ethics similar to that espoused by Langdon Winner [40] that
the technology artifact itself has politics and is thus appro-
priate for normative evaluation. That is, he rejects that all
ethics around technological artifacts are socially determined
and argues that history has shown us that the artifacts them-
selves carry political and ethical weight. We now offer a few
reasons why the advent of machine learning may embolden
such a stance.
2.2 Why "Fair" Matters
In line with Winner’s position, we should not see an ML
model as a blank slate that can only be evaluated after ap-
propriation by some organization. Not only might an ML
artifact mediate ethically charged situations, but further it
is an artifact carrying some amount of agency. From this
vantage, "fair" ML is a recasting of the very idea of fair ac-
tion in the human sense. Though it may be perceived that
adding a "human in the loop" could solve our issue of ethi-
cal machine autonomy, research shows that "users may be
prone to place an inordinate amount of trust in black box
algorithms that are framed as intelligent" [34]. Meaning that
even when an ML model is not acting autonomously, it is
causing normative sway that is not neutral.
Further, we must consider that as actions coordinated by
an ML model intervene in more of our lives, these actions
are not always welcomed or requested [4, 5, 37]. As Frank
Pasquale points out in "The Black Box Society," how we are
categorized through data affects how we will be treated [27].
Grounding this thought, we ask whether someone who has
never requested therapy, counseling, or any sort of diagnosis
should be considered "open game" for a mental health classi-
fication. There is not an easy answer to this which begs the
original question of whether any ML model that classifies
mental health on social media data is fair.
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Finally, we want to point to the fact that often the choice
of a training objective is contentious in and of itself. There
are some cases where the objective has a clear consensus,
say in the case of classifying radiology images by whether a
cancerous tumor is observed. There is little dispute that the
goal here is to be as accurate as possible at identifying cancer.
On the other hand, determining whether an individual con-
victed of a crime might be a repeat offender is likely to solicit
a lot of disagreement. Re-appropriating terminology from
Richard Rorty [31], we distinguish between these two cases
as normal and abnormal objectives, respectively. Meaning
the objective of some ML tasks have a very clear grounds
for consensus (normal) and others are highly disputable (ab-
normal). Due to the fact that ML could be applied to either
kind of task, we believe this consideration elevates the level
to which an ML model may be considered political or up for
normative evaluation.
3 CURRENT STATE OF FAIR ML
In light of our argument that questions of fairness operate
contextually and that the advent of ML elevates our need for
normative evaluation of technology artifacts, we move on to
apply our contextual framings of fair to the contemporary
Fair ML literature. We believe progress has been made, but
mostly within the scope of framings Q2 and Q3 and almost
exclusively employing some variant of "preventing disparate
impact" as the definition of fairness.
3.1 Is it Fair to Make X ML system?
Outside of broad critical reflections on the use of technical
systems [8, 17], there is yet to be much work characterizing
grounds for why an ML system may or may not be a fair ap-
proach for a particular problem space. One might anticipate,
given a normative definition of fairness, that questions of
whether any data could ever approximate certain problems
would provide grounds for healthy cross-disciplinary debate.
However, "If we can, we ought to," is often treated as an
unstated premise for technological development. An excep-
tional case, is the contemporary debate around autonomous
weapons where thousands of scientists have supported a
total suppression of development in this area [18].
In the Fair ML literature, a recent example of researchers
asking more general questions about fairness is [6]’s eval-
uation of the ethical implications of ML for autonomous
experimentation. Recognizing that practitioners have largely
ignored established human-subject research guidelines laid
out by the Common Rule and Belmont Principles, the authors
argue that automated experimentation may cause harms
from privacy-violating inferences and exposing users to less-
than-ideal outcomes by being part of the experiment. While
falling short of actually questioning whether automated ex-
perimentation should be allowed at all, they suggest the
adoption of an external review process in light of the fact
that it’s intractable to obtain consent from each user due
to the complexity of the systems being tested. One might
construe their high-level question as "Is it fair to make au-
tomated experimenting ML systems?" and their answer as
"Maybe, but we should have external oversight."
Though we would be interested in a broader debate about
the fairness of research ethics using ML systems, the con-
clusion drawn supports a more normative evaluation of fair-
ness in this realm. Specifically, the idea that external review
may be needed hinges on ideas of authority and context;
namely, should we give engineers blanket authority to exper-
iment on users? Akin to P1 above, research ethics are such
that a review board should check your experimental stan-
dards and participants must be given certain rights. Thus, we
agree with the suggestion of external review and further that
certain autonomous experiments likely should not be done.
Through our lens we would argue many other areas (e.g.,
ML for biometric inference, ML for emotional persuasion)
are ripe for debate around the limitations of what systems
are fair to implement.
3.2 I want to make X ML system, is there a
fair technical approach?
Surveying the ML literature, we see three categorical trends
signifying answers this question. The first grouping is re-
search related to interpretability or "white box models" [38,
39, 41]. That is, this body of research approaches fairness
by developing training methods that aim to produce inter-
pretable ML models. Whether the model is fair becomes a
matter of whether an explanation of the results is interpreted
as fair. This intersects with the EU’s upcoming adoption of
"the right to an explanation" law and researchers’ calls for
algorithmic due diligence [12]. In our view, this approach has
the most affinity with our P1 fairness definition given that
it opens up the possibility for models to be interpreted by
various subjects (allowing for contextual considerations) and
sets forth future possibilities for recourse and disagreement.
The limitations of this approach are 1) this approach is not
yet feasible for more complex algorithms (ie, most current
trends in the ML field) and 2) fairness is bound by the ability
for a subject to meaningfully understand and act on the in-
terpretation as the interpretability guarantees nothing about
the fairness of the algorithm itself.
Our second categorization includes attempts to resolve
disparate treatment concerns by developing statistical in-
dependence between predictions and protected categories.
These approaches include methods to satisfy fairness by en-
forcing robust sampling across groups [10], minimizing the
difference in misclassification rates across groups [43], and
training models where protected variables are neither ex-
plicitly nor latently used [24]. All of these methods define
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fairness in relation to treatment across known protected
classes and give authority to an engineer (or perhaps part-
nered legal advisor) to a priori determine which variables are
protected. This is a limitation due to the fact that some prob-
lem spaces may not have obvious or measurable categories
that deserve protection (e.g., should we target someone for
prescription drugs at a inferred moment of vulnerability?).
A further limitation to this class of approaches shown by
ML researchers is that there are inherent trade-offs between
a) well-calibrated models, b) parity between groups in the
positive class, and c) parity between groups in the negative
class [23].
A third category of work involves decision-making al-
gorithms that attempt to construct fair metrics for optimal
choices. These attempts start with the adoption of a quality
function that evaluates decisions and then argue for differ-
ing approaches toward optimizing choices such as always
making choices that minimize regret (ie, integral over time
of difference between choice and optimal choice) [21] or en-
forcing that a choice never be made when a higher-quality
one was available [20]. A major limitation of this work is
that its baseline standard of fairness is baked into the choice
of a quality function, giving a lot of subjective authority
to an engineer, and leaving only long-term and short-term
optimizations to consider, which can be hard to reason about.
3.3 I made X ML system, are the results
fair?
This realm of work might be construed as "algorithmic dam-
age control" given that the attempt is not to make a fair
algorithm, but rather to develop post-hoc analysis methods
that help discover what may be unfair about a black box
model. One class of approaches, again premising fairness on
prevention of disparate treatment, involves developing math-
ematical tools to determine whether features related to pro-
tected categories (either directly or through co-variates) are
influential on the model [2]. A number of these have come in
direct relation to the buzz around the problematic recidivism
instrument [11, 42]. Given our P1 criterion, these methods,
at best, may help an end-user assess whether disparate im-
pact occurred given a set of known protected categories.
However, at worst, if we do not know which categories to
assess for disparate impact, they may allow a model to pass
as fair while unfair biases are still present. In summary, it
is a progress that we have ways to verify if an approaches
satisfies a disparate impact constraint; however, we are still
levied with the challenge of deciding what the constraints
should be.
The other major theme in this area of fairness brings back
interpretability, but instead of model interpretability, the aim
is interpreting why a particular result was obtained [15, 29].
While this has been successful in certain cases where re-
searchers had an intuition about what kind of internal repre-
sentation the model may have been using, these interpreta-
tions rely on naive, simplified approximations of the model.
That is, they are unable to interpret the model globally and
instead regress on a set of features in a localized subspace.
Again, interpretability satisfies certain normative criteria of
fairness by giving some power to an end-user to understand
a result. However, so long as we cannot interpret the results
globally, it’s unclear how much power of recourse one may
gain from such an interpretation. Further, this approach only
allows us to interpret results using a predefined axis, mean-
ing if we must know what we are looking for before this
method becomes useful.
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the above, we introduced a normative definition of fairness
for ML and evaluated it against the current literature. We
showed that there are multiple possible framings of fairness
that raise different questions about "what is fair in ML" and
require different evaluative constructs. Our first summary
remark is to point out the limited nature of focusing ML
fairness on disparate impact. A corollary of prior research
shows that disparate impact and accurate model-making are
in fundamental tension [11, 23] and ideal fairness defined
this way may even be impossible [16]. Models are discrimi-
nators and as such, adding constraints affects one’s ability
to make a good classifier. Further, we may consider why it
is engineers have pressed forward with different disparate
impact constructs without yet inviting dialogue with the
vulnerable communities for which they are trying to protect.
This brings us to address the most critical takeaway if
one accepts a normative criterion of fairness (such as P1):
engineers must invite in vulnerable communities and in-
dependent advocacy groups to engage in dialogue around
fairness. We are sitting on the cusp of a societal transforma-
tion where many human intelligent tasks will be transferred
to machine intelligence. Exciting as this might be, engineers
should be cautious to move too quickly and leave behind the
populations who are outside of the networks of the academic
and industry elite. If we want to preserve our democratic
essence, it is mandatory we develop the standards of the
machine through inter-community dialogue. While this con-
versation is at its beginnings, there are already groups such
as the Council for Big Data, Ethics, and Society forming to
address these needs. Expanding the number of organizations
discussing ethics and working with outside communities,
making "usable fairness" a requirement in the development
of ML tools, and ensuring that universities and business are
teaching fairness and ethics to young engineers will all be
critical to legitimizing the authority of the "fairness" embed-
ded in our ML systems.
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